



CAUSES OF MODERN COUPS AND CONSIDERATION OF FACTORS AFFECTING THE ESCALATION OF THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN ARAB COUNTRIES

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Abstract

Purpose of the study: The article describes the comparative analysis of the main parameters of the Arab Spring Revolution. The Arab world is the ethnic core of the Middle East. These countries faced an acute problem of choosing their political strategy. Globalization has largely discounted the idea of national sovereignty and a self-sufficient economy with the leading role of the public sector.

Methodology: The main methodological approaches are defined using the basic principles reflected in leading researchers' works in political, historical, and social sciences. The complete application of comparative historical analysis allowed us to determine the main stages and trends in developing political processes within the "Arab spring" framework. The use of modeling and forecasting methods allows determining options for further development of these processes.

Main Findings: The Middle East and North Africa took part in the forced revolutionary transformation of political regimes, called the Arab spring. The growth of protests in the region is due to internal and external reasons. Each country depends on the specific socio-political, economic, religious situation, and the characteristics of states' historical development.

Applications of this study: Based on the results of this study, it is possible to develop new recommendations for the foreign ministries of countries that are neutral in relation to the processes of socio-political transformations in the Arab countries.

Novelty/Originality of this study: This study is one of the first attempts to consider the socio-political processes that took place in the countries of the Arab East through the prism of Kazakh diplomacy, as a country that does not have certain geopolitical goals and benefits, as a country that does not have a direct or indirect relationship to the events of the Arab spring.

Keywords: *Arab Spring, Political Crisis, Arab Countries, North Africa, Middle East, Political Regimes.*

INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of 2011, some states in the Arab world have changed by forcing political regimes. In connection with the revolutionary political transformations, the crisis in the countries, the threat of escalation, as well as the intervention of foreign states and international organizations became more relevant when considering the parameters of the Arab Spring revolution (Tinawi, 2019). Therefore, the factors that led to instability require a comprehensive study of the transformation of political regimes in the Arab world. To do this, a comparative analysis of the political consequences of the Arab Spring process is necessary.

To date, states such as Egypt, Libya, Syria are experiencing the effects of unrest that began in early 2011. A direct consequence of the Arab Spring in North Africa was the spread of its influence in other countries of the Greater Middle East, and the destabilization of the situation in several countries of the region.

Events in the Middle East in 2011-2012, called the "Arab Spring"

The Arab Spring is a series of uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011-2012, which led to internal political, economic, and social problems, as well as the influence of external factors in the Middle East, with the collapse of the ruling regime and, in some cases, civil war. A phenomenon that is still characterized by shaking in the area (Kurpebayeva, 2019). The revolutionary processes in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa received the conditional name "Arab Spring". Ponomareva believes that the "Arab Spring" is an improved form of the struggle of the West for geopolitical domination (Ponomareva & Rudov, 2012). Relating to the methods of planting democracy, the revolution of 2011-2013 demonstrated efficiency in elections in the Arab states (Campante & Chor, 2012). Due to the deposition of the previous authoritarian regimes, there is no one to replace the old power, since the democratic forces are weak and split by internecine conflicts, and their public support is small. As a result, after the revolutions in the Arab countries, a systemic crisis ensued. None of the goals were achieved. Stepanova (2011), exploring the causes of the Arab revolutions, thinks about the fundamental role of social discontent in the escalation of conflicts. Analyzing the situation in Egypt, the author points out a sharp gap, even by Middle Eastern standards, between the ordinary people and those who are highly corrupt, are pro-Western ruling political and economic elites, and are well integrated into the global economy (Stepanova, 2011). A famous politician and orientalist E.M. Primakov regarded the phenomenon of the Arab

Spring as a revolutionary wave that spontaneously fell in early 2011 on the Middle East authoritarian regimes (Primakov, 2012). For the French political scientist and orientalist Francois Burgat, the “Arab Spring” is a series of popular uprisings in the Arab world that began with the “Tunisian Spring” in January 2011 (Burgat, 2011).

Authors such as A.B. Korotayev and Yu.V. Zinkina cite a sufficiently strong argument that the cause of the social explosion was the economic and demographic problems of the countries of the region (Korotayev & Zinkina, 2011). Naif Al-Shammari also explains the Middle East revolutions as internal political and ethnic issues and power struggles (Al-Shammari & Willoughby, 2019). Denis Bauchard, an adviser to the French Institute for International Relations in the Middle East, also writes about the internal causes of the social explosion, “Egypt has long had to confront social issues, economic development has not kept pace with rapid demographic growth, and a situation where 40 percent of the population lives on two dollars in a day, has become truly explosive” (Bauchard, 2011). The phenomenon of the Arab Spring with all the influence of an external factor is perceived as a product of internal development.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the political processes that took place in 2011-2014 in the Middle East and North Africa. Therefore, the main question of this study is: Are the events of the "Arab spring" a logical consequence of the ineffective management of the political regimes of this region? Are events the result of external interference? From this main question, the following subtasks are divided:

1. What was the socio-political development of the countries of the region on the eve of the events of civil will, can mass protests be considered unexpected?
2. Political regimes in the region would be able to avoid bloodshed, whether they were for dialogue with the opposition?
3. What role did external players play in these processes?

Based on the questions of the problem under study, the following hypothesis was formulated:

The events in the countries of the Arab East referred to as the "Arab spring" has shown the world that despite the despotism and brutality of regimes, the absence of real opposition, spontaneous rallies can develop into larger-scale protests that can lead to the overthrow of regimes or civil war.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The dominants of the political course of M. Gaddafi became “Islamic socialism” and direct democracy. Islamic Socialism was called upon to unite the developing Arab countries and free them from the ideological expansion of both the West and the Soviet bloc (Berger & Spoerer, 2001). Direct democracy or “direct democracy”, rejecting the parliamentary system, implied the direct rule of the people through a system of people’s committees and people’s congresses. In 1977, the Libyan Arab Republic was renamed the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Jamahiriya in Arabic - the power of the people). However, the regime of M. Gaddafi, denying all forms of democracy existing in the modern world, dictated their policies to the “people’s committees”. The receipt of legislative functions by the General People’s Congress from the Council of the Revolutionary Command meant the transfer of legislative power under the control of M. Gaddafi. The reorganization of the ministries into secretariats (Erameh, 2017), the apparatus of the chairman of the council of ministers - the Supreme People’s Committee transferred the executive branch into the personal jurisdiction of the Libyan leader (Turku, 2018). M. Gaddafi was largely able to achieve their goals. First of all, it was about approaching the ideal of a socially homogeneous society by increasing the level of per capita income. The Libyan leader managed to implement his slogan “Wealth in the hands of the people!”. The difference between rich and poor is reduced. The structure of the economy has been transformed - the population has received a personal interest in the final product, being its owner (Islam et al., 2019). Changed attitude to labor and production. The broad masses were first attracted to participate in public administration (Relly & Cuillier, 2010; Nepomnin & Ivanov, 2010). Being the poorest Arab country in the 1950s, Libya under the rule of M. Gaddafi has achieved impressive economic progress, improving the living standards of the population, strengthening the public sector. In foreign policy, the regime of M. Gaddafi was adamant: he opposed the West, against Israel; supported the strengthening of Libyan nationalism and the unification of the Arab world around Libya (Landa, 2005). An anti-imperialist policy was pursued, which led to isolation and clashes with Western countries (Sperber, 2005).

In the ideological sphere, the doctrine of Arab unity dominated for a long time (Banwell, 2018), uniting the countries of North Africa and the Middle East on a secular-ethnic basis, contributing to the development of national liberation, anti-imperialist movements (Nepomnin & Ivanov, 2010). But this doctrine is from the early 1970s experienced a deep crisis due to both internal reasons and the opposition of Western countries. In Egypt and Libya, two main ideological trends constantly competed: secular nationalism, inspired by Western political thought, and “Muslim nationalism”, which relied on Islam as a symbol of resistance to the West. The long colonial rule of the West led to the fact that the role of Islam in the countries of North Africa was significantly limited (Maddison, 2007). After gaining independence, Islam became a source of state identity, ideology, and values (Gearty, 2016).

Islam in various ideological and political interpretations has become an integral part of the political course of the ruling elites. The Islamic factor in the political processes of the Arab countries is being studied by many experts. Islam

influences political institutions, political actors, and the socio-cultural sphere in the Arab countries ([Kurpebayeva, 2018](#)).

As for the foreign policy of Libya, then, having come to power in 1969, Muammar Gaddafi took an anti-Western position. Immediately after the coup, in October 1969, the Permanent Representative of Tripoli at the 24th session of the UN General Assembly made a statement on Libya's desire to cease all Western military bases on its land ([Human Rights Watch, World Report, 2018](#)). London and Washington were informed of the termination of all relevant agreements. Naturally, neither the United States nor Great Britain was very unhappy with the policies of the new head of state. Already in 1970, all banks were nationalized, in 1973 Libya, together with Algeria and Iraq, established its control over oil production, as a result, the entire oil industry was nationalized. Libya's relations with France were not easy. Since gaining independence in 1951, Libya has consistently stood in the way of France's interests in North Africa. After Muammar Gaddafi came to power, the confrontation only worsened. Libyan troops fought with Chad, and Libyan money armed and trained extremists from Morocco and Algeria. The confrontation reached its climax on September 19, 1989, when in the sky over Niger, the Libyans blew up a liner of the French airline UTA with 170 passengers on board. As a result, in April 1992, at the request of the United States and Great Britain, the UN Security Council imposed international sanctions against Libya. International sanctions adversely affected the economic situation in the country; several social projects were curtailed. Only in 2003, after the American occupation of Iraq, Muammar Gaddafi changed his policy, recognized the fact of terrorism. He announced his refusal to develop weapons of mass destruction, allowed international experts into the country, and declared his desire to resolve the issue of compensation for the victims of terrorist attacks, despite Libya's declared "non-involvement" in them ([Melyantsev, 2008](#)). In October 2004, Libya was completely freed from international sanctions ([Lamer, 2016](#)).

As for Syria, it should be noted that the discontent in Syria, resulting in a full-scale confrontation ([Anderson, 2017](#)) and civil war, was due to unresolved social problems and were religious and ethnonational in nature ([Yermekbayev et al., 2019](#)). So, the main problem was the principle of the distribution of posts in the state apparatus by religious affiliation (the Sunnis, who constitute the majority of the country's population, had limited rights to fill posts in government bodies, in contrast to the Alawites (Shiite religious movement) ([Comunello & Anzera, 2012](#)), on which the former president of the republic relied Hafez Al Assad, as well as the Kurdish problem: the protesters' demands came down to lifting the state of emergency (introduced back in 1963) and eliminating secret prisons, the resignation of provincial governors, the trial of perpetrators of civilian deaths ([Saleh & Peel, 2011](#)).

METHODOLOGY

The research was conducted by employing the following methods:

- The use of general scientific methods of analysis allowed us to reveal the essence of socio-political processes in the Arab East region.
- The historical review method allowed us to reveal important issues of the region's countries' socio-political development on the eve of mass protests.
- The use of comparative analysis methods allowed us to identify the main similarities and differences in the opposition and the government's actions.
- The modeling method allowed us to predict the further development of the regime-opposition relationship.

Background of the political processes of the Arab Spring (on the example of Egypt, Libya, and Syria)

North Africa, like the entire Middle East, is at the stage of catching up with industrial development. Egypt and Libya are forced to integrate into the political transformations that began outside their borders and caused the process of democratization around the world, which means the transition to market relations, the weakening of state participation in the economy, and the establishment of democratic institutions. The following modernization components have become relevant for Egypt and Libya. First, catching up with socio-economic development and overcoming the backwardness that impedes innovative institutional changes. Secondly, the transformation of the social sphere: stimulating productive labor, increasing employment, providing the population with affordable education and health care. Thirdly, at the stage of transition from the agrarian form to the industrial developing countries, it was necessary to solve the problem of limited own funds for large investments. Fourth, given the global trends in economics and politics, a choice has been made between a "closed" and an "open" development model. The "closed" model contributes to a stronger mobilization of domestic resources and identifies external causes of the country's backlog. The "open" model is more inclined to borrow, its transparency is supported by foreign investment.

Socio-economic development, overcoming backwardness and the transformation of the social sphere in the Republican period of Egypt and Libya occupies an important place, were implemented in different ways. The decisive here was not only to follow the chosen socio-economic strategy but also to solve the problem of limited own resources for modernization - the choice of a national development model ([Pieterse, 2011](#)). Egypt was more integrated into the processes of globalization, and Libya took the path of regionalization.

In Egypt, the nationalism of G.A. Nasser combined with the ideas of "Arab socialism". President A. Sadat built his

political course, fully focusing on the West. H. Mubarak pursued a multi-vector policy, considering various centers of world influence. Towards the end of the 20th century, the results of globalization in Egypt became noticeable. In the economic aspect, this is, first of all, market expansion based on competition caused by the policy of liberalization of foreign economic activity. An important role is played by the exchange of resources, carried out through global supply structures, primarily through financial and information networks. In the political sphere, the number of political entities and the degree of their interdependence increased. Thus, the carriers of globalization penetrate the political space of Egypt: transnational corporations, transnational banks, the Internet community, various international coordinating organizations. In this sense, globalization reflects a qualitatively new stage of permeability of borders. Many researchers argue that by the end of the reign of H. Mubarak, Egypt was in a state of economic stagnation, poverty, inequality, corruption, and unemployment. As a result, the local private sector did not seek to invest in the national economy; reforms were complicated by a lack of finance, a shortage of qualified managerial staff, and a lack of technology ([Al-Sharekh, 2011](#)).

Among the main problems that gripped Egyptian society, experts highlight the widening gap between rich and poor, the increased level of corruption, and the lack of a competitive political system in which people can fight for power. The main domestic destabilizing factors, which are the basis for destabilizing the situation, were the food and demographic problems ([Haas, 2017](#)). These two areas of threats to national security are closely related to each other. Providing the country with food is one of the priority issues in Egypt. Although the minimum set of food products is subsidized by the state, there is a low dynamic in the development of the agricultural sector in the country. Today Egypt imports up to 60% of the required food. The dynamics of rising food prices caused a worsening of the situation of the poor, which in turn served as the basis for social instability.

The food supply situation is exacerbated by the effects of demographic problems. The population of the country is increasing annually by 1.1-1.2 million people. According to scientists, in 2025, 96-100 million people will live in Egypt, in 2065 - 115-120 million people. The rapid increase in the number and reduction of mortality is a burden on the whole range of economic, social, and environmental problems. Peak growth in numbers occurred in 1985-1987. From this, it follows that the largest number of young people aged 20 to 25 years falls in 2010-2011. The labor market is not able to absorb all graduates of schools and universities. The percentage of unemployed among high school graduates exceeded 31%, and universities - 11.8%. For many years this problem has been not only social but also political. It is young people who do not have reliable prospects to find a worthy place in life, to practically apply the acquired knowledge, that has become one of the main sources of replenishment of the ranks of radical Islamic organizations, including terrorist ones. The rapid growth in the share of young people can undermine existing political coalitions, creating instability. Large cohorts of youth often attract new ideas or heterodox religions that challenge old forms of power. Besides, young people are relatively easy to mobilize to participate in social or political conflicts ([Veninga & Ihle, 2018](#)). In addition to the above, dissatisfaction was also caused by the current tough, corrupt ruling regime since 1981, a state of emergency, and election fraud. The situation was aggravated by the preparation of the son of H. Mubarak Gamal as a successor as president.

As for Libya, the conditions of political destabilization were contradictory. The country successfully developed economically, having the largest oil and gas reserves in Africa, which provided the regime of M. Gaddafi with significant influence over the entire continent.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Over 20 years, the economy has developed at a rapid pace. Therefore, Libya was an investor in other African countries, provided up to 15% of the budget revenues of the African Union, covered the debts of other countries, providing them loans for the purchase of its oil. Due to rapid demographic growth (youth reaches 40-50% of the population of Libya) unemployment has increased ([Kohstall, 2015](#)). Let's clarify that there were jobs in industry and agriculture, but they were no longer satisfied with the increased claims of youth. They were occupied by immigrants, mainly from Egypt, and most importantly, there were many Coptic Christians among them. Despite the serious social assistance of the state (cheap housing was being built on a large scale, education and medical support were readily available), the outrage of the young Libyans grew. As in Egypt, the issues of bribery, police arbitrariness, informational closeness, which strengthened the desire to protest, were painfully perceived. The constant interactions of Egyptian and Libyan societies, their historical and cultural ties are important. However, having similar ethno-confessional and sociocultural parameters and geopolitical determinants of development, Egypt and Libya are distinguished by long-term conditions of political processes. In some aspects, they are the opposite. In other aspects, the political strategies of Egypt and Libya had a partial contrast: in the two countries, different economic strategies were used. The population of Egypt had an extremely low standard of living, and in Libya, an income level was provided before the overthrow of M. Gaddafi.

B. Assad proved himself to be a flexible politician, in particular, a week after the start of the speeches, the Assad government promised the Syrians to abolish the state of emergency (the decree on cancellation was signed on April 20, 2011), censorship, and allow opposition political parties. reform the judicial system, create conditions for free elections. Also, on February 26, a referendum was held in Syria on the draft new constitution, the main innovation of which was the abolition of the leadership of the Ba'ath Party, and the equality of all political parties was established ([Melyantsev, 2000](#)). These decisions have become unprecedented for the entire Middle East region and, if the plan had been

implemented in full and on time, Syria might have managed to avoid the revolution and become a democratic state. One of the indirect causes of popular discontent, according to some Western experts, was also an unprecedented drought, affecting more than half of Syrian lands in the period from 2006 to 2011 due to mismanagement and irrational use of land by the government. According to the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 2009, about 800 thousand people in Syria lost their livelihood, in 2010 their number was already 1 million ([The World Bank, 2010](#)). These reasons led to a mass exodus of the country's rural population to the cities. In particular, in the city of Aleppo alone (the country's second most important city) during the indicated period more than 200 thousand people resettled, while the large number of Iraqi refugees who flooded the country after the US-Iraq war in 2003, which contributed to armed conflict ([Manfreda, 2003](#)). The key attention during the formation of foreign policy in Syria was paid to relations with Israel, Turkey, and Iran, as well as Russia ([Yermekbayev et al., 2020](#)). Under President B. Assad, the role of Iran in the region has increased markedly, which, according to several monarchs of the Persian Gulf and the leaders of several other Arab countries where Sunnis are in power, poses a threat to the formation of the so-called "Shiite arc" or "Shiite crescent". As regards military cooperation, one of the key stages here was the signing in 2006 by the Minister of Defense of Iran M. Najar and his Syrian counterpart H. Turkhamni of a defense agreement. In 2011, Iran provides Syria with the assistance of 23 million dollars for the construction of a military base in Latakia. After the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, Iran continued to provide not only political support to the official authorities of Syria but also financial, diplomatic, and military assistance in the form of arms supplies and the provision of elite units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to protect the country's leadership ([Berman, 2011](#)).

Under B. Assad, Israel and the United States remained the main enemies of Syria ([Anderson, 2017](#)). After the Iraq war in 2003, Washington stepped up accusations against Damascus of interfering in the Iraq conflict and supporting regional terrorist groups. European countries, Israel, and the United States accused Damascus of sponsoring the Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad terrorist groups. At the same time, despite the open support of these Islamic organizations, Bashar did not deny the possibility of peaceful dialogue with Israel. Despite such claims, in 2002 the United States included Syria in the "axis of evil". And in 2004, the United States imposed economic sanctions against Syria. Today, Western countries are actively assisting the Syrian opposition, constantly strengthening economic sanctions, applying a set of political, diplomatic, financial, and economic measures, as well as forms of outreach pressure on the government of the republic ([Al-Hamad, 2003](#)). The external opposition of Damascus in the Middle East is openly led by the royal family of Saudis and the emirs of Qatar, while they have received the support of most Arab countries, they are supported by Lebanese liberal circles, Turkey, the United States, and EU countries ([Santos et al., 2018](#)). Bashar al-Assad from the very beginning of his reign failed to build constructive partnerships with Western countries.

[Barany \(2011\)](#) argued that if the regime is providing the army with the political and socio-economic demands and the soldiers are well paid, it's more likely for the army to take the regime's side and protect it. [Svolik \(2011\)](#) argued that militaries should be given political power and resource to suppress the protestors on the regime's side. Regimes could gain the military's loyalty by 'buying off the officer corps by granting them economic privileges and self-enrichment opportunities' ([Amnesty International, 2016](#)).

In Syria, this has been fairly successful, as some people in Damascus allegedly continued to deny that a national uprising was even occurring until six months into the uprising when protests and demonstrations began in the capital city ([Chenoweth, 2011](#)).

Summing up the analysis of B. Assad's domestic policy, the authors can conclude that Assad's reforms were inconsistent, and some undertakings were subsequently revised. The changes carried out by the president (the abolition of the state of emergency, the adoption of a new constitution that abolished the leadership of the Ba'ath Party in the country, etc.) were carried out belatedly and did not lead to stabilization of the situation in the SAR.

Instead of achieving either of these outcomes, these killings backfired, provoking such outrage that fresh demonstrations erupted throughout the entire country ([Timeline: Tunisia's Uprising, 2011](#)).

The general weakness, "slowness" of the design of the authoritarian regime, the alienation between the government and the people, the inability of the government to consolidate its supporters also affected ([Turku, 2018](#)). As a result, Syria plunged into a civil war, which took part in the form of interfaith confrontation between the Sunnis and Alawites. Moreover, in the ranks of the Syrian armed opposition, radical Islamist groups, represented mainly by foreign Sunni militants, began to gain more weight ([The World Bank, 2009](#)).

In foreign policy, B. Assad gave priority to the development of bilateral relations with Iran and Russia. The president also sought to maintain partnerships with Turkey, but Turkey itself, after the uprising in Syria, revised its position and supported the opposition. During his presidency, B. Assad was unable to build constructive relations with Israel and the United States. At the same time, US policy towards Syria is characterized by rigidity and a clear desire to overthrow the ruling regime ([Islam, 2008](#)).

The Syrian imbroglio bears all the hallmarks of the new Arab cold war, including the domestic struggle between a regime and opposition each with outside patrons, attempts to fan the flames of sectarianism, and dueling narratives regarding who is really attacking whom. Like the earlier Arab cold war, the conflict is awash in propaganda and disinformation ([Salim Al-Rawashdeh & Abdulkareem Akho Rshaidah, 2014](#)).

Thus, the events of the "Arab spring" had a significant impact on shifts in the balance of power in the Middle East. This is due to a change in political regimes, the strengthening of terrorist organizations, and the emergence of new conflicts in the region, such as the civil war in Syria and Yemen ([Kurpebayeva, 2020](#); [Alharbi et al., 2020](#)).

The depth and severity of systemic crises associated with the inability of Arab societies to achieve the success of political modernization increased at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century. The national state in these countries has not yet been built and consolidated, but it is already outdated on a global scale. The key question has become more complicated - the adaptation of Western models of democracy to Islamic socio-cultural conditions and an authoritarian political tradition ([Lamer, 2016](#)). The authors indicate several causes of the crisis: the transformation of traditional institutions and the acceleration of economic growth; the absence in many states of an established national community; the dominance of tribal structures in Libya with the basic role of a religious-communal population, ethnic fragmentation of the population, the artificiality of state and administrative borders created by the colonialists. The listed components are reinforced by the sociocultural traditions of the self-organization of the personification of power and neglect of laws. In various ways, this served as a prerequisite for the consolidation of authoritarian political regimes in power, which are not just a "rollback" to the archaic, but a kind of symbiosis of modern and archaic, traditionalist institutions and practices. It is useful to call such political regimes neo-patrimonial ([Idris, 2017](#)).

The causes of social unrest in Arab countries lie in numerous factors, both internal and external order ([Rofii, 2020](#)). External factors superimposed the acute internal socio-economic and political problems that could not be solved in the post-colonial period in the form of the consequences of the global economic crisis and the different processes of globalization. The role of the external factor in forming the objective prerequisites for social upheaval in the Arab states was minimal, but the subjective one was quite significant.

The consequences of the Arab revolutions are now presented to a greater extent as unfavorable, not only in the economic, social but also in the political fields ([Oatley, 2016](#)). As the July events of 2013 in Egypt show, the post-revolutionary consensus between the main political forces in this country never came. There is hope that authoritarian leaders, who have been in power for a long time not only in the Arab world but also in other third world states in general, will learn from the Arab revolutions and will periodically rotate political elites from above, without waiting for this process by their citizens "from below."

Despite the internal problems in Syria, the main factor that destabilizes the situation in the country, in the authors' opinion, is external, since, as the presidential elections showed, a significant part of the population in the country supports the Syrian leadership and its political course, and the 2011 Syrian leadership the reform president satisfied almost all the basic requirements of the constructive opposition.

The reforms implemented by President Assad would not have been able to stabilize the situation in the country and avoid civil confrontation, as NATO countries have already sought to use mass protests to overthrow the regime they do not like. In particular, authors who are sympathetic to the current Syrian authorities share this opinion.

Experts who support the opposition's desire to change power hold another opposite opinion ([Gearty, 2016](#)). They argue that initially the Assad couple did not seek to improve the socio-political situation in the country, and the reforms did not have a positive effect due to the regime's unwillingness to implement real reforms.

After almost a decade of Arab spring, Western countries involved in Libya's, Yemen's, and Syria's proxy wars need to look at their policies and do some soul searching ([Tuygan, 2019](#)).

CONCLUSION

The revolutionary events in Egypt, Libya, and Syria were unexpected and at the same time expected. They became unexpected due to uncontrollability and poor predictability. Expected - due to the logic of global development, the policy of the West on uncompromising expansion under the auspices of the establishment of democracy throughout the world. But the destabilization of political regimes in these countries, caused by the "Arab awakening", has a complex causal relationship.

The population growth in Egypt, the increase in the number of youth in 2010-2011, led to a threat to the social security of the state, which created the prerequisites for social instability in Egypt. Based on the analysis of Egypt's foreign policy, it can be concluded that the overthrow of the H. Mubarak regime in Egypt was not in the sphere of interests of the leading actors in international relations, therefore the authors can only talk about the presence in that period of interest in the gradual change of power in a democratic way with the advent of loyal political leaders.

The growth of discontent in Libya was facilitated by a split in the country's political elite in connection with the reform, a departure from social reforms, and a strengthening of the vertical of power led to the violation of the "feedback loop" in the state. A special place in the outbreak of armed confrontation in the country belongs to the tribal factor, which, after the beginning of the speeches, began to play a decisive role, causing a split in Libyan society and instability in the state. The foreign policy of Muammar Gaddafi was anti-Western, which could not but affect the policy of Europe and the United States concerning Libya. At the same time, relations with Russia and China began to develop actively, which did not correspond to the interests of Western states.

LIMITATION AND STUDY FORWARD

The article is limited by social unrest in the Arab countries and regions of the Middle East and their socio-economic and political consequences. Further research will be aimed at further studying developments in the Arab World.

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AUTHORS CONTRIBUTION

Gaziza Kurpebayeva is the author of the article. She made a significant contribution to the concept and development of research, data collection, analysis, and interpretation. Compiled and adjusted the content of the article. Responsible for all aspects of the work related to the accuracy or integrity of any part of the study.

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