

ADMINISTRATIVE FAILURE TO CURB SECTARIANISM WHILE BRINGING SOCIAL REINTEGRATION INTO WAR-TORN AREA OF DISTRICT HANGU, PAKISTAN

Waqar Ahmad^{1*}, Mussawar Shah², Ahmad Ali³, Asad Ullah⁴, Naushad Khan⁵

^{1*,2,4,5}The University of Agriculture, Peshawar, Pakistan; ³Abdul Wali Khan University, Mardan, Pakistan.

Email: *waqaryousafzai@uoswabi.edu.pk

Article History: Received on 27th March 2021, Revised on 19th May 2021, Published on 3rd June 2021

Abstract

Purpose of the study: The present study highlights the administrative causing institutional intra-faith disintegration and its revival to social reintegration in district Hangu-Pakistan.

Methodology: The study proceeded with a sound conceptual framework comprised of the independent variable, i.e., administrative failure to curb sectarianism, and dependent variable, i.e., "social reintegration," bypassing these through a sound statistical operationalization, i.e., chi-square and factor analysis, respectively. A sample size of 306 representing all leading categories of the study was chosen by stratified random sampling procedure to ensure the true representation of the masses living in the study area.

Main Findings: The study disclosed that administrative failure had a strong and significant relationship with disintegration as causative factors and had been identified as a catalyst towards the social reintegration provided. Both literate and illiterate are taken into consideration for their involvement in the reintegration process while restructuring the administrative state of the area, as pointed out by the literate respondents.

Applications of this study: The study recommended that the government should take initiatives by indulging all the stakeholders for greater social inclusion in the study arena, allowing both sects to participate in the common values under the ambit of Islam. A policy of non-interference by the state of Pakistan needs to be designed and communicated accordingly to all forces involving particular reference to the neighboring states.

Novelty/Originality of this study: To the best of my knowledge, little empirical work in this area has been conducted in the Pakistani context. Thus, this study will be helpful in policy planning on both local and international levels.

Keywords: *Administrative Failure, Sectarianism, Social Reintegration, Causative Factors, Institutional Intra-faith Disintegration.*

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, Pakistan State and their military agencies had spawned a complex web of militant outfits, comprised of Afghani Taliban and numerous militant groups executed dozens of terrorist attacks in India. This nexus divulged that Pakistan's militants, state, and administrative policies posed a perilous menace to the region and international security, which had been reflected in the explosion of mechanism examining Pakistan's military-mullah-militant complex (Hussain, 2008; Jamal, 2009; Rashid, 2009), and describing the proliferating militant and extremist groups, their connections, and operations (Abbas, 2007; Fair, 2004; Jamal, 2009; Mir, 2004, 2008; Rana, 2004). Regional patronization of religious institutions and jihadi training campsites propped up groups of Taliban and Al-Qaida by rudiments of the Pakistani state. They were the decisive transformation of the Shia-Sunni conflict into parallel ethnic-nationalist sectarian deviation (Malik, 1999). Congruently, the growing tide of sectarianism was also allied to the non-existence of lucid long-term institutional and administrative policies to address the subject of sectarian warfare. Administrative and legitimate action against militant and radical outfits had failed to dismantle a well-entrenched and extensively feasted terror infrastructure (Basit, 2013).

The political use of religion by all institutions of the state, particularly administrative entities, endorsed an antagonistic competition for official patronage among inter-faith and intra-faith identities (Ahmar, 2007). Consistently, confiscating backing and funding for militancy in Pakistan needed operative policy approaches that would locally and administratively recognized, provincially-tailored, grouped specific, and stretched beyond delegitimizing jihad as an apt means for social action to coup the dilemma ever (Fair et al., 2010). Though Musharraf's policy reflected this ambivalence, he banned six organizations in 2003, but they were still operational under the new tags and were candidly involved in sectarian violence across the region (Abbas, 2010). Although, numerous militant operations and radical activities were wangled and planned at headquarters of these sectarian outfits under the shadow of their pioneers. Because of the religious concealment, administrative authorities, police, and other law enforcement agencies usually avoided or hesitated to apprehend such radical activists. A wobbly administrative system and troubled law and order situation provided them with an ideal atmosphere for unlawful and sectarian activities.

In early 2015, the interior ministry of Pakistan also informed Senate that financial backing for the elevation of extremism would be discouraged because this was rigorously detrimental to administrative structure, law and order situation, and sectarian harmony in the state (Raza, 2015; Shah, 2014). Consistently, the criminal justice system of Pakistan had a low

conviction rate of 5 to 10%. However, 75% of militants were acquitted due to lack of evidence, amongst other reasons. Moreover, weak prosecution cases were filed by the police often failed to hold up in the courts. Several prosecutors and judges had also abandoned many cases after getting death threats in writing.

Furthermore, eyewitnesses had been intimidated by militants to draw back their statements or avoid appearing in the courts. It had also been divulged that incapability of police and other law enforcement agencies to anticipate and probe the sectarian crimes had furthered in the augmentation of violent sectarian outbreaks. The investigation mechanism of police was hindered by the absence of modern technology, DNA analysis, forensics, electronic data, and ill-trained personal with obsolete tools. Besides, another administrative catastrophe in the amplification of sectarianism was the easy availability of lethal weapons, which had taken sectarian warfare to new altitudes (Basit, 2013). Keeping the above scenario, the present study is an attempt to explore the relationship between administration failure with the emergence of sectarian-based violence.

Throughout the centuries, this region has remained non-sectarian and peaceful. However, roughly few micro-level conflicts appeared amongst numerous sects. Still, they were settled at the primary level through negotiation or dialogue (Waseem et al., 2010), but the situation of sectarianism has deteriorated since the impendence of Pakistan (Shah, 2014). Ample literature determined the significant role of demographic, political, and socio-economic factors, which influenced and converted the religion of peace and tranquility into radicalism and chaos. Numerous studies conceded that high per capita income surges the incidence of militancy and realization (Freytag et al., 2011; Ismail & Amjad, 2014; Looney, 2004; Murphy & Malik, 2009; Nasir et al., 2011; Shahbaz et al., 2013; Syed et al., 2015). In Gilgit Baltistan, the administrative dichotomy was thought to be a rudimentary reason for sectarianism (Bansal, 2008). In Karachi and Punjab, almost failure of the administration, institutional corruption, law and order, particularly mechanism of criminal investigation and network of intelligence agencies, had shaped the situation of freedom of any sort of action for any determined terrorist and criminal. Militant sect-based organizations, ethnic groups, even common criminals were completely aware of the vulnerability of the law enforcement agencies and took the edge of their institutional and administrative ineptness and crumbling state (Ahmad, 1997).

Particularly, in the Pashtun belt, Kurram, Orakzai, and Khyber Tribal districts in erstwhile FATA, Hangu, and Kohat districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, local Sunni and Shias had a periodic conflict and enmity with each other over the decades. But, since the 1980s, these tensions had been considerably aggravated by the active involvement of exterior and interior forces, i.e., influx of Afghan refugees, numerous militant groups, financed insurgents of foreign actors, local sect-based organizations, poor administrative policies of the Pakistani state, and elements associated to the Afghan, Saudi Arabia and Iranian governments (Fazli, 2012; Rafiq, 2014). The sectarian catastrophe in Kurram district (former agency) also incited the Shia community in Karachi, some of whom were threatened by the government. Unless the government and administrative authorities cleared the area of Taliban, while many Karachi-based Shias warned, they would march towards the Kurram region to help and assist the plagued Shias community over there. However, as always, the government and administrative entities acted tardily and improved the situation marginally. Thus, after few years, militant groups from the region of North Waziristan tried to get involved in the tribal belt of the Kurram area, intending to get a safe route for their movement into Afghanistan (Abbas, 2010). Particularly, there didn't arise any organized sectarian or ethnic violence in Parachinar until Pakistan's interventionist strategies in Afghanistan resulted from the influx of Afghan Islamist extremist groups and thrived an ease trade route of arms and drugs (Ahmad, 1997).

The objective of the study

To highlights the administrative causing institutional intra-faith disintegration and its revival to social reintegration in district Hangu-Pakistan.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The sole aim of the present study was to focus on the administrative failure to curb sectarianism and its revival to social reintegration in the district Hangu Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pakistan, as a bulk of the Shia and Sunni population is inhabiting the area for a long. According to the Pakistan Census report (2017), the Hangu population was 518,798 and 48,270 households, having two tehsils, i.e., Hangu and Tal, and 17 union councils. The study population was composed of all those inhabitants living in district Hangu. However, a leading segment of the study focus was made on extracting information from the educated class. Therefore, lawyer as a leading class, notable electable members who were elected through local government/local bodies, religious clergies having a profound association to the study based on nature of the study and persons from law enforcing agencies like police along with academicians, i.e., college lecturers and professors having a liaison with both sects, i.e., Shia and Sunni were potential respondents of the study.

In addition, this study adopts a quantitative method, and the study designed was based on cross-sectional. Sampling is one of the essential parts of decision-making over obtaining accuracy in terms of the size of respondents to be chosen for getting information. This appropriate size may lead to increase reliability and accurate conclusion of the study at hand. Kothari (2004) has precisely explained the relative strength of obtaining sample respondents through a clustering procedure, as this procedure enhances the efficiency in the field based on ease. The relative sample of each stratum was chosen through a random sampling procedure which is mentioned below. It is pertinent to mention that the total population size of the aforementioned categories stood at 1564. A sample size of 306 was chosen based on Sekaran's

(2003) criteria. The total sample size was again divided and allocated to each stratum through a stratified random sampling procedure as below;

Table 1: Showing the distribution of each stratum and relative sample size

S.No.	Name of each Strata	Population (Each Strata) (N)	Sample Size (n)
1	Electable Members in Local Government	797	156
2	Religious Clerics	386	75
3	Police Personnel's	290	57
4	Lawyers	48	10
5	Academicians	43	8
Grand Total		1564	306

Source: Authors

Likert scale is a phenomenon, which is highly suitable to the study at hand. This type of method is highly reliable (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1987; Ullah & Muhammad, 2020). In such cases, all statements were designed with the help of personal observation and by taking inputs from earlier review literature. Each statement was categorized through various responses shown against each by Yes, No, and Don't Know, respectively. The Likert Scale was taken into operation to measure the responses of the independent variable, namely administrative failure to curb sectarianism and the dependent variable social reintegration.

Indexation is a phenomenon wherein a single concept is measured based on the items as a measuring tool. It is one of the leading norms in conducting social research as it is based on combining into two or more than two items to establish the basis of the construction of indexation (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1987). The dependent variable, social reintegration, was indexed in the initial stage to get the required response. In such a way, the independent variable administrative failure to curb sectarianism was also passed through such fashion to achieve the required information. This process was further characterized with the help of chi-square for making it appropriate to explain and predict the outcome based on the interaction of variables. The procedure was explained by applying other statistical tools like factor analysis to augment each other inferences. The collecting data was analyzed using a proper statistical technique (Frequency Distribution) through SPSS version 22. Bi variate is the distribution of the data in the aftermath of cross-tabulation of the dependent and independent variables, respectively. Different appropriate statistical tests help determine the level of association or the degree of correlation between the two variables (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1976). In this study, the relationship between independent and dependent variables was cross-tabulated and presented into a 3/3 table as per the requirement of the nature of the data.

Moreover, to ascertain the degree of association, the Chi-Square test was put into the application to determine the level of association (McCall, 1975). Multi-Variate analysis through Contingency tables helps to determine the relationship obtained at the Bi-Variate level to be either spurious or non-spurious. It is usually conducted when basis variables like education, income, and sect were taken as control variables and explained through the application of the chi-square test.

Factor Analysis is a statistical method that aims to describe variability amongst observed, correlated variables to measure the unobserved variables. It is usually assumed that observed variables might have been affected by some unobserved variables in the term of measurement results. Its theory involves the information gained through interdependence between observed variables to reduce the set of variables in the data set. The theory supports the assumption that factor analysis helps to deal with data set to adjudge a large no of observed variables in the light of the potential underlying/latent variables, which may end at the commonality of results. It may be either an exploratory factor analysis or confirmatory factor analysis (Bartholomew et al., 2008; Cattell, 1952; Fruchter, 1954).

Earlier to applying the aforementioned tools, the initial reliability analysis was carried out. It was composed of two keys methods, i.e., Split half and Cronbach Alfa Test. Cronbach Alfa (α) test was used in the present research to a workout a reliability test. It was applied to ascertain the underlying dimensions of the items. An index composed of this test requires all the items that are coded in the same direction, with the items representing the same idea to be summed up through the test. It helps in explaining the overall average of all possible split-half coefficients. It is usually arranged from 0-1. The data to correspond if it touches 1 or closer to 1, indicating the moving of coefficient towards the highest level, thus indicating a high-reliability outcome. In most cases, if it is more than 0.8, it is considered to be highly reliable (Bryman & Cramer, 2002). However, in the case of social sciences this value (Coefficient) up to 0.6 is acceptable (Bagozzi & Yi (1988); Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Nachmias & Nachmias, 1987). In the present study, reliability was applied in two steps; in the first step, both variables, i.e., dependent and independent, were included and explored a Cronbach's Alpha of .728. While in the second step, reliability and internal consistency for each variable were measured and found Cronbach's Alpha 0.679 for administrative failure to curb sectarianism and 0.727 for social reintegration, which indicated the study variables were highly reliable in predicting the study outcomes.

Table 2: Conceptual Framework

Background Variables	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable
Education		
Income	Administrative failure to Curb Sectarianism	Social Reintegration
Sect		

Source: Authors

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Education level of the sampled respondents

The frequency distribution and percentage proportion of respondent's education level in the study area are given in Table 3. The majority of respondents, i.e. (25.5%) have 10 years of education, the qualification of 22.5% of respondents were 16 years and above, 21.9% of respondents were studied till 12 grade, and 21.2% respondents were studied up to 14 years respectively. Moreover, a negligible number of, i.e., 8.8% of the respondents were illiterate. Provision of education and framing policies to ensure its smooth and unabated transmission has a strong relationship with the transformation of social order by putting it on the path of growth and development in physical human resource contexts. Moreover, reducing conflicts and other issues of divergent nature could easily handle and addressed as tolerance is one of the virtues of education.

Table 3: Showing the education level of the sampled respondents

Education level	Frequency	Percentage%
Illiterate	27	8.8
10 Years	78	25.5
12 Years	67	21.9
14 Years	65	21.2
16 Years and Above	69	22.5
Total	306	100.0

Source: Authors

Family monthly income of the sampled respondents

Table 4 discloses the family monthly income of the sampled respondents. The majority of the respondents, i.e., 40.5%, had monthly income in the range of PKR (30000 to 45000), 35.6% of respondent's monthly income was above PKR 60000, and 12.7% of sampled respondents had monthly income in the range of PKR (15000 to 30000). In addition, Table 4.1.7 indicated a PKR (45000 to 60000) income constituted of 11.1% of the respondents respectively. These findings were in alignment with the explanation shown on the basis of occupation. Further, all classes of society within the range of different categories on the basis of earning had been drastically affected by these infightings.

Table 4: Family monthly income of the sampled respondents

Family monthly income	Frequency	Percentage%
15000 to 30000	39	12.7
30000 to 45000	124	40.5
45000 to 60000	34	11.1
60000 and Above	109	35.6
Total	306	100.0

Source: Authors

The sect of sampled respondents

Table 5 unveils information regarding the sect affiliation of the respondents in the study area. The majority of the sampled respondents, i.e., 54.6%, belonged to the Sunni sect of the Muslims, while 45.4% of the respondents were Shias in the study area. These findings alluded to the existence of all these two major sects with almost equal representation. Stability could easily be ensured if a sound consensus on the basis of harmonious ways of living is reached. Otherwise, distance and non-acceptance of one other are detrimental to the smooth functioning of the social system as envisaged from the present case.

Table 5: Showing the sect of the sampled respondents

Sect	Frequency	Percentage%
Sunni	167	54.6
Shia	139	45.4
Total	306	100.0

Source: Authors

Frequency and percentage distribution of Administrative failure to curb sectarianism

Administrative failure regarding appropriate action against militant organizations has badly failed to dismantle a well-entrenched and extensively spread over the terror of sectarian violence. Besides, all banned militant groups continue with different labels, while their old names are also still in use. Leaders of such groups enjoy virtual protection from the law and masses of their faction.

Table 6 disclosed results about administrative failure while eliminating sectarianism in the study area. The result showed that less than two-third, i.e., 190(62.1%) of the respondents stated that due to fragile state control has weakened the administrative dynamics of the study area, while some, i.e., 58(19.0%) of the sample size, negated this statement. About half of the respondents, 156(51.0%), opined that being part of a rigid tribal culture, we had little trust in resolving problems through state legal discourse, but this statement was denied 75(24.5%) of the sample size. These results could be attributed to the existence of a state within the state. However, the administrative structure is functional but weak enough to encounter the cultural hegemony regarding the maintenance of law and order. It is commonly observed that in Pakistan competence of central and regional government has always remained in question about its deliverance in containing law and order situation through the civilian administrative structure. Governance malfunctioned also contributed to a trust deficit in government which has generated several issues of distrust and inefficiency on the part of executing agencies. Likewise, consecutive governments in Pakistan are either unwilling or not competent enough to solve the problems ([Mahsood & Kamran, 2017](#)).

Furthermore, about half 148(48.4%) of the sample size stated that the informal administrative system of controlling the social system is perjury to the country's legal system; however, this statement was negated by some of the 80(26.1%) respondents. Moreover, about one-third of 107(35.0%) of the respondents disclosed that poor law and order are the resultant factor of ineffective policing in the area, while the majority of the respondents, i.e., 160(52.3%), refuted this statement. These findings augmented the preceding outcomes, which disclosed the state and cultural dynamics about law and order were paradox in nature and deliverance. For instance, these findings were in close resemblance to [Yusuf \(2015\)](#), who composed in Foreign Policy, "Poor governance and insufficient social services are subsidizing to the diffusion of radicalism in the province, as radical groups fill the political space by providing services in terms of education and rehabilitation." Furthermore, [Khan \(1997\)](#) also stated that sectarianism has also worsened the law and order situation in other parts of the country. It has spread its limbs from Karachi to Gilgit and posed a serious threat to the fragile state and social harmony.

It was also raked up from the results that the majority of respondents, i.e., the 213(69.6%), opined that through community-based policing, the administrative gap/vacuum should be captured, but at the same time, this statement was negated by some 47(15.4%) of the sample size. About one-third 98(32.0%) of the total sample size disclosed that local clashes were supported under the guise of administrative cover to strengthen each sect's positions, but more than half 171(55.9%) of the respondents were in contradiction with this statement. Besides, the majority, 187(61.1%), of the respondents stated that lack of strong administrative authority led to the division of local administration on sect-based division. However, some sample sizes, i.e., 75(24.5%), negated this statement. These findings alluded to the existence of a vacuum in the administrative domain due to ineffective services provided by the state maneuvers to control terrorism or local people mistrust over these agencies as these (local) did not cooperate in eliminating the terror-related activities.

Moreover, an ideal situation where local peoples could participate by becoming part of the local police was lacking, thus engaging into an unbridgeable gap, which might be a harbinger to the persistence of terrorism in the area. These findings were closely related to the work of [Mahsood and Kamran \(2017\)](#) that in Pakistan, the structure and function of the state are about to be collapsed. They further added that Pakistan is non-democratic, virtually based on an authoritarian mode of government that contributes and influences the relations amongst various sects, which could generate sectarian division. It was further disclosed by about half of the respondents, 150(49.0%), stated that Jirga, an institution of resolving issues, lost its vitality due to division of society on sect bases, but some of the 132(43.1%) sample size negated this statement.

The Jirga system is considered a kind of political system that survives in societies based on similarity within the group as one of the distinct characteristics of the study area. In Pakistan, the Jirga system often overlaps with the government system when a family dispute gets taken to court or when a Jirga ruling brings about government prosecution ([Shakil, 2017](#)). Moreover, traditional local leadership portals to address issues had also weakened the fragile administrative control disclosed by a majority of 172(56.2%) respondents. While this statement was rejected by about one-third of 100(32.7%) of the total population. About one-third, i.e., 95(31.0%) of the respondents stated that drifting from legal to traditional and otherwise; led to the emergence of administrative lacunas in the social system, but the majority 142(46.4%) of the respondents were found uncertain about this statement. For instance, it has also been highlighted in [Shakil, 2017](#) that disputes amongst confronting parties take an extra-legal direction, mostly when the legal system is not effective and powerful enough to deal with the situation. These views were further strengthened by the leading number of respondents, 134(43.8%), that administrative mode swings, either operate opt to operate within the law operators or

throw it to the cultural dynamics for settlement has led the situation to nowhere. Moreover, the state agency's dubious role in addressing and accessing the unwanted issue has further deteriorated the operational capabilities of the state.

Table 6: Showing Frequency and percentage distribution of Administrative failure to curb sectarianism

S. No.	Statement	Yes	No	Don't Know	Total
1	Fragile state control has weakened the administrative dynamics of the study area	190(62.1%)	58(19.0%)	58(19.0%)	306(100)
2	Being part of a rigid tribal culture, had little trust in resolving problems through state legal discourse	156(51.0%)	75(24.5%)	75(24.5%)	306(100)
3	The informal administrative system of controlling the social system is perjury to the legal system of the country	148(48.4%)	80(26.1%)	78(25.5%)	306(100)
4	Poor law and order is the resultant factor of ineffective policing in the area	107(35.0%)	160(52.3%)	39(12.7%)	306(100)
5	Community-based policing is a true discourse to capture the administrative gape/vacuum	213(69.6%)	47(15.4%)	46(15.0%)	306(100)
6	Local clashes were supported under the guise of administrative cover to strengthen each sect positions	98(32.0%)	171(55.9%)	37(12.1%)	306(100)
7	Lack of strong administrative authority led to the division of local administration on sect based division	187(61.1%)	75(24.5%)	44(14.4%)	306(100)
8	Jirga, an institution of resolving issues, lost its vitality due to the division of society on sect bases	150(49.0%)	132(43.1%)	24(7.8%)	306(100)
9	Traditional local leadership portal to address issues had also weakened the fragile administrative control	172(56.2%)	100(32.7%)	34(11.1%)	306(100)
10	Drifting from legal to traditional and otherwise led to the emergence of administrative lacuna in the social system	95(31.0%)	69(22.5%)	142(46.4%)	306(100)
11	Frequent and unwanted interference in the administrative dynamics by different state agencies faced the system with no point of fixation	134(43.8%)	55(18.0%)	117(38.2%)	306(100)

Source: Authors

Association between Administrative failure to Curb Sectarianism and Social Reintegration

A state across the globe is governed through three main pillars; administration is one of them. A strong and dynamic administrative structure envisages the rule of law, the prevalence of a system of social sanction, and a vivid path for political organizations to proceed by putting before the masses their agenda to achieve both economic and political goals.

Table 7 disclosed the association between administrative failure to curb sectarianism and social reintegration. It has been envisaged from the results that a strong significant ($p = 0.000$) association between fragile state control has weakened the administrative dynamics of the study area and social reintegration. These findings could be directed to the poor state of law and the non-existence of state institutions to govern and direct the prevalent social system in the hour of crisis. It has alluded from the literature that regional and local patronization of madrassas and jihadi training campgrounds, supporting of the extremist groups like Al-Qaida and Taliban by the rudiments of the Pakistani state and society were decisive in transforming the Shia-Sunni cliff disagreement into a parallel national-ethnic sectarian divergence (Malik, 1999). Likewise, the association between Jirga, an institution of resolving issues, lost its vitality due to the division of society on sect bases, and social reintegration was found highly significant ($p = 0.000$) as well.

Moreover, frequent and unwanted interference in the administrative dynamics by different state agencies faced the system with no point of fixation was found highly significant ($p = 0.000$) and social reintegration. The above results revealed the pathetic situation as the sole outcome of the disappearance of non-formal institutions like Jirga, which was highly instrumental in bringing peace and tranquillity to both individual and collective levels. Moreover, unwanted and unabated state inference to control the local's behavior under the grab of state agencies also led the situation into social disarray. In recent years, state military agencies and intelligence agencies have breaded a complex web of militant groups that comprehend the Afghani Taliban and numerous Pakistan-based militant groups which have carried out dozens of terrorist attacks throughout India. Similarly, operational militant groups in India remain a probable catalyst for India Pakistan war with the menace of intensification to advertent or inadvertent nuclear weapon use. The vibrant consensus that Pakistan's militants pose serious threats to the state and global security is reflected in the explosion of different workouts, analyzing Pakistan's military-mullah-militant complex (Hussain, 2008; Jamal, 2009; Rashid, 2009), and describing the proliferating militant groups with their obvious connections and operations respectively (Abbas, 2007; Fair, 2004; Jamal, 2009; Mir, 2004, 2008; Rana, 2004).

Also, a significant ($p = 0.032$) association was determined between being part of a rigid tribal culture, had little trust in resolving problems through state legal discourse, and social reintegration. Similarly, poor law and order is the resultant factor of ineffective policing in the area, and social reintegration was also found significant ($p = 0.005$), respectively. It could not be ruled out that the study area has been governed through partial state apparatus along with its local social dynamics, being consented upon by every resident. Attacking and disabling local social dynamics with no alternates led the area to a social and administrative un-resting condition. Likewise, in numerous regions of Pakistan, i.e., Karachi and Punjab, the nearly entire failure of the administrative mechanism of law and order, particularly intelligence network and criminal investigation, had shaped a state of freedom of action for their determined criminal and radical activities. Congruently, the endemic corruption in the police department, law enforcement agencies, the politicization of all civilian intelligence agencies, and the numbness of policy-making institutions at both levels, i.e., provincial and federal, had all contributed to the collapse of the law and order situation in society.

The radical sectarian outfits and even common criminals were fully aware of the vulnerability of the law enforcement agencies, and they took an edge from their institutional failure and decrepit state (Ahmad, 1998). Additionally, local clashes were supported under the guise of administrative cover to strengthen each sect's positions was significantly ($p = 0.001$) associated with social reintegration. These results affirmed the state interference in the local situation by the state apparatus. The modus operandi was dichotomous, i.e., gaining political well through the use of the monetary application. These findings in lines with Gishkori (2015), who pointed out that in early 2015 a written reply submitted by the ministry of interior affairs in the Senate that "financial assistance for religious or sectarian drives was discouraged because it was detrimental to law and order and sectarian harmony in the state." Likewise, the lack of strong administrative authority led to the division of local administration on sect-based division, and social reintegration was significant ($p = 0.024$) in association with social reintegration. Correspondingly, it has been evident from table 4.3.2 that drifting from legal to traditional and otherwise led to the emergence of administrative lacuna in the social system was found significant ($p = 0.012$) with social reintegration. These findings strongly endorsed the preceding findings of the state, where the non-existence of administrative machinery, the involvement of state agencies in fueling the situation on a sect basis through the use of money become harbinger to the social disintegration in the area.

However, a non-significant ($p = 0.212$) relation between the informal administrative system of controlling the social system is perjury to the country's legal system and social reintegration. People's affirmative stance in believing the local social institutions like Jirga in the deliverance of peace and tranquility was assured through the emanation of these findings. Likewise, community-based policing is a true discourse to capture the administrative gape/vacuum, and social reintegration was also found non-significant ($p = 0.320$) as well. These findings revealed the non-prevalence of e-policing might have contributed towards the rehabilitation of the already social trust of the people in local administration. Similarly, the relationship between traditional local leadership portals to address issues had also weakened the fragile administrative control was determined as non-significant ($p = 0.055$) with social reintegration. It could be attributed to the non-productive role of traditional leadership. As obvious from the above findings, local leadership was ineffective due to the indulgence of other state stakeholders in local affairs. These findings could be easily linked with the findings of (Fair et al., 2010) that a central authority both at the provincial and central level is missing, which could delegitimize the local approach of solving issues through the use of force under the garb of religion. However, understanding the local dynamics and the framing policy approach for redressing is the cry of the day.

Table 7: Association between Administrative failure to Curb Sectarianism and Social Reintegration

S.No.	Statement	Response	Social Reintegration			Statistics
			Yes	No	Don't know	
1	Fragile state control has weakened the administrative dynamics of the study area	Yes	128(54.9%)	48(84.2%)	14(87.5%)	$\chi^2 = 23.223$ $p = 0.000$
		No	51(21.9%)	7(12.3%)	0(0.0%)	
		Don't know	54(23.2%)	2(3.5%)	2(12.5%)	
2	Being part of a rigid tribal culture, had little trust in resolving problems through state legal discourse	Yes	119(51.1%)	32(56.1%)	5(31.3%)	$\chi^2 = 10.537$ $p = 0.032$
		No	63(27.0%)	6(10.5%)	6(37.5%)	
		Don't know	51(21.9%)	19(33.3%)	5(31.3%)	
3	The informal administrative system of controlling the social system is perjury to the legal system of the country	Yes	114(48.9%)	27(47.4%)	7(43.8%)	$\chi^2 = 5.836$ $p = 0.212$
		No	66(28.3%)	12(21.1%)	2(12.5%)	
		Don't know	53(22.7%)	18(31.6%)	7(43.8%)	
4	Poor law and order is the resultant factor of ineffective policing in the area	Yes	91(39.1%)	13(22.8%)	3(18.8%)	$\chi^2 = 15.071$
		No	108(46.6%)	39(68.4%)	13(81.3%)	

		Don't know	34(14.6%)	5(8.8%)	0(0.0%)	$p = 0.005$
5	Community-based policing is a true discourse to capture the administrative gape/vacuum	Yes	159(68.2%)	42(73.7%)	12(75.0%)	$x^2 = 4.696$ $p = 0.320$
		No	40(17.2%)	7(12.3%)	0(0.0%)	
		Don't know	34(14.6%)	8(14.0%)	4(25.0%)	
6	Local clashes were supported under the guise of administrative cover to strengthen each sect positions	Yes	88(37.8%)	9(15.8%)	1(6.3%)	$x^2 = 19.783$ $p = 0.001$
		No	115(49.4%)	44(77.2%)	12(75.0%)	
		Don't know	30(12.9%)	4(7.0%)	3(18.8%)	
7	Lack of strong administrative authority led to the division of local administration on sect based division	Yes	151(64.8%)	30(52.6%)	6(37.5%)	$x^2 = 11.195$ $p = 0.024$
		No	55(23.6%)	16(28.1%)	4(25.0%)	
		Don't know	27(11.6%)	11(19.3%)	6(37.5%)	
8	Jirga, an institution of resolving issues, lost its vitality due to the division of society on sect bases	Yes	122(52.4%)	27(47.4%)	1(6.3%)	$x^2 = 31.340$ $p = 0.000$
		No	93(39.9%)	30(52.6%)	9(56.3%)	
		Don't know	18(7.7%)	0(0.0%)	6(37.5%)	
9	Traditional local leadership portal to address issues had also weakened the fragile administrative control	Yes	133(57.1%)	35(61.4%)	4(25.0%)	$x^2 = 9.264$ $p = 0.055$
		No	73(31.3%)	19(33.3%)	8(50.0%)	
		Don't know	27(11.6%)	3(5.3%)	4(25.0%)	
10	Drifting from legal to traditional and otherwise led to the emergence of administrative lacuna in the social system	Yes	81(34.8%)	11(19.3%)	3(18.8%)	$x^2 = 12.830$ $p = 0.012$
		No	45(19.3%)	16(28.1%)	8(50.0%)	
		Don't know	107(45.9%)	30(52.6%)	5(31.3%)	
11	Frequent and unwanted interference in the administrative dynamics by different state agencies faced the system with no point of fixation	Yes	114(48.9%)	17(29.8%)	3(18.8%)	$x^2 = 25.651$ $p = 0.000$
		No	48(26.6%)	5(8.8%)	2(12.5%)	
		Don't know	71(30.5%)	35(61.4%)	11(68.8%)	

Source: Authors

Association between respondent's attitude towards administrative failure to curb sectarianism and social reintegration (Controlling Literacy)

Table 8 revealed a non-significant ($p = 0.205$) relationship between administrative failure to curb sectarianism and social reintegration among illiterate respondents. While at literate respondents relationship between the aforementioned variables was found significant ($p = 0.020$) while controlling literacy. Furthermore, the relationship on the illiterate side was spurious, but on literate was found non-spurious. These findings could be attributed to the International Crisis Group (ICG) findings that in Pakistan, sectarian conflict is the direct outcome of state policies of Islamization as well as the marginalization of secular democratic forces. Instead of empowering democratic and liberal voices, the state co-opted the religious right and continues to rely on it to counter civilian opposition. The political usage of Islam by the state unticked an antagonistic competition for official patronage between and within the many breaches of Sunnis and Shias, with the clerical elites of foremost sects and sub-sects striving to build up their political parties and groups to get their motives achieved (Ahmar, 2007). Stringent resistance to curb sectarianism in urban and semi-urban areas of Pakistan has been unpleasant in ramifications for both military and political leadership of Pakistan. It needs to curb religious violence as an act of criminal nature through prosecution capacity (Fazli, 2012).

Table 8: Association between respondent's attitude towards administrative failure to curb sectarianism and social reintegration (Controlling Literacy)

Literacy as a Control variable	Independent variable	Dependent variable	Statistics
Illiterate	Administrative failure to Curb Sectarianism	Social Reintegration	$x^2 = 5.917$ $p = 0.205$
literate	Administrative failure to Curb Sectarianism	Social Reintegration	$x^2 = 11.695$ $p = 0.020$

Source: Authors

Association between respondent's attitude towards administrative failure to curb sectarianism and social reintegration (Controlling Income)

In the low-income group, a non-significant ($p = 0.993$) relationship was found between administrative failure to curb

sectarianism and social reintegration. In the medium income level, the relationship was also found non-significant ($p = 0.779$) between administrative failure to curb sectarianism and social reintegration. Contrary, in the high-income group, a significant ($p = 0.004$) relationship was found between the aforementioned variables. Findings explored the relationship was spurious between aforementioned variables for low and medium-income groups, while non-spurious for the high-income group as indicated by the identical relationship at the bi-variate level. In Pakistan, the political explanation is linked to the cynical usage of sectarian conflict and non-discordance for short-term political gain by successive governments. In the early 1980s, in Karachi, sectarian discord was used among Sunnis and Shias by the martial law government as a cathartic measure and as a means of seeding dissent among its political rivals in a politically sensitive region (Ahmad, 1998). It is evident from history that central authority could only be effective when it is strictly delimited and defined. While unfortunately, Pakistan is like a European segmentary society that existed in the 20th century. Although hovering amid centralization and anarchy, society is exemplified by a regime type that drains life from a region; because of its fragility, it fails to establish strong institutions. Additionally, it is a place where tribes are stronger, and the central government is comparatively weak (Kaplan, 2012). This might be the primary reason that sectarian violence intensely increased in Pakistan after Dictator General Zia's regime (Afzal et al., 2012).

Table 9: Association between respondent's attitude towards administrative failure to curb sectarianism and social reintegration (Controlling Income)

Income as a Control variable	Independent variable	Dependent variable	Statistics
Low	Administrative failure to Curb Sectarianism	Social Reintegration	$x^2 = 0.013$ $p = 0.993$
Medium	Administrative failure to Curb Sectarianism	Social Reintegration	$x^2 = 1.763$ $p = 0.779$
High	Administrative failure to Curb Sectarianism	Social Reintegration	$x^2 = 15.157$ $p = 0.004$

Source: Authors

Association between respondent's attitude towards administrative failure to curb sectarianism and social reintegration (Controlling Sect)

The relationship between the respondent's attitude towards administrative failure to curb sectarianism and social reintegration was found non-significant ($p = 0.225$) in the Sunni group of respondents residing in the study area. Likewise, a non-significant ($p = 0.281$) relationship was also detected between the aforementioned variables while taking sect as a control variable. Results at both levels, i.e., Sunni and Shia, were found non-spurious, respectively. The erstwhile former FATA, now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, had a history of Shia-Sunni periodic conflicts for a long. However, in 1980, s soon after the onset of the Iranian revolution in Iran and invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR triggered the external agent to establish their stakes with the sole purpose of furthering their untold agenda, thus fueled the division of the study area on sect based composition (Rafiq, 2014). Pakistan as a state did not respond timely in checking the activities of these organizations through administrative means. These proscribed organizations strived and succeeded in recruiting youngsters from the area to establish the state within the state. Pakistan as a state failed to deliver in cohesive terms for the integration of administrative structure with cultural and social endorsements (Fazli, 2012).

Table 10: Association between respondent's attitude towards administrative failure to curb sectarianism and social reintegration (Controlling Sect)

Sect as a Control variable	Independent variable	Dependent variable	Statistics
Sunni	Administrative failure to Curb Sectarianism	Social Reintegration	$x^2 = 5.668$ $p = 0.225$
Shia	Administrative failure to Curb Sectarianism	Social Reintegration	$x^2 = 5.064$ $p = 0.281$

Source: Authors

Factor Analysis

Construct Identification and Validation

To check the validity and stability of the construct, Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was performed on the reflective variables in the data to make a construct of the observed item. Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), Principal Component Analysis (PCA) were performed with a Promax (oblique) rotation method in the extraction to make constructs. While the standard was used for the construction of factors based on Eigenvalues greater than one instead of fixed value extraction, as at first, the nature of the data was checked using based on Eigenvalue method thinking in mind that fixed factors criteria will be selected. If the analysis makes more than the required factors, an iteration limit of 25 was allowed, a small coefficient with an absolute value less than 0.3 was used to avoid the low factor loading and were found a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy 0.668 were above the recommended threshold value of .668, as

shown in Table 11. No value less than 0.3 was found in the communalities in the PCA. Suitability of the construct and factor analysis are gauged through Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy, Bartlett's Test of Sphericity, error variance explained, and factor loading greater than 0.40. The measuring criteria were indicated that the variable was uncorrelated and was suitable for factor analysis (George, 2011; George & Mallery, 2006; Hair et al., 2006; Kim & Walker, 2012). The above description shows that most of the assumption for factor analysis was according to the recommendation of the earlier literature which exhibits the validity of the data. However, some of the cases were ambiguous. It could be attributed to inapt responses regarding the situation and the prevalence of different opinions, and the belief system in both Shia and Sunni sects in the area. The divergence of belief-based opinion among these sects was the source of difference in opinion on questions put on them. Thus, the diverging responses to these questions were obtained. Thus, the diverging responses caused factor dispersion and didn't make the required factors in the exploratory factor analysis. As the required assumption was not fulfilling, therefore, we can't run confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).

Table 11: KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.	.668	
	Approx. Chi-Square 1480.265	
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Df.	253
	Sig.	.000
Communalities and Reliability		
Components	Factor	
	1	2
A1	.432 social1	.623
A2	.669 social2	.711
A3	.692 social3	.688
A4	.644 social4	.788
A5	.569 Socia5	.557
A6	.508 social6	.471
A7	.486 social7	.753
A8	.576 social8	.646
A9	.622 social9	.662
A10	.628 social10	.573
A11	.703 social11	.590
	social12	.614
Cronbach Alpha(Combine)	.679	0.727
	.728	

Source: Authors

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Any society has been pillared on its important domains; administration is one of them. Deliverance on the administrative domain with ample support could be properly attributed to the smooth functioning of the state as a unit. Chaos, unrest, and challenges to the writ of the state to curb are essential to maintain normalcy, tranquility, and harmony in reciprocal terms to both state and individuals, respectively.

The study found that social fragmentation prevailed in the study area in light of the administrative failure to curb sect-based division under the pathetic approach of the incumbent government. It was dismantled that state policies coupled with its fragile control over the administrative domain ruined the reign of government being centralized and unified parse. Such a dilemma resulted in poor law and order situation with an ultimate end to chaos and dys-functionalism in society's formal and informal social structure. The rise of sectarianism unticked the politics of small-scale group uprising, which had strong politico-cum militant group thrashing the very ideology of central oriented dynamics of politics. The government's placid role and apathy to address the issue of sectarianism vide strengthening the institutions through the process of institutionalization left the study area to witness a total collapse and dys-functionalism instead of mainstreaming and rehabilitation. The area witnessed that traditional mechanics of controlling and predicting human behavior to extend enduring status were formidably lost due to the disintegration of prevalent social order as the study area witnessed a lacuna in the legal and administrative collapse along with the fall of traditional aspects of resolving the issues. The rigid division on a sect basis augmented the local forces to replace the centuries-old traditions and values through the use of force as the political leaders fled the area leaving a space for the insurgents to breathe in the social integration, was put at stake with no hopes of reintegration with diminishing the logo of national-based politics and administration. Unabated interference on the part of both leading powers destroyed the stability and pushed the area to a

web of proxy war. Controlling income, literacy, and sect, the study disclosed that the literate considered administrative failure as the causative factor of social disintegration.

Some of the recommendations are put forwarded in light of the conclusion of the study:

- The government of Pakistan should take initiatives by indulging all the stakeholders for greater social inclusion in the study arena. All such social cum political dynamics must have a strong endorsement from the prevalent cultural perspective.
- Lack of wisdom methodology was lacking to reverberate the role of local and regional administration towards the process of social reintegration. It is profoundly suggested that all sects living in an area should be involved in participating in the common values under the ambit of Islam. Moreover, if some unexplained scenarios exist, efforts should be made to establish consensus among these sects through the process of politics cum cultural and administrative approach.
- All sect leaders were found to be involved in playing their role for sect-based politics and harmony. If taken into confidence, such leaders inculcating them the notion of oneness through the enlightenment of state ideology would certainly help achieve some of the objectives of social reintegration. For this purpose, the political organization should come forward and mainstream these elements in the leadership arena of local politics. Such a package would serve as a model of rehabilitation and well-being of the locals rather than pushing for destructive ends.
- The study also dismantled that infighting and war with raising tendencies in terrorism were not the internal elements for the locals. These were imposed by foreign forces. While focusing on exploring the administrative and political lacuna, the state of Pakistan must design a model of social reintegration by involving the locals in the reconciliation process.
- A policy of non-interference by the state of Pakistan needs to be designed and communicated accordingly to all forces involving particular reference to the neighboring states.

LIMITATION AND STUDY FORWARD

The present study was conducted only in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which certainly limited the study results. Further study is needed at the Pakistani level.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

During this study, there was no conflict of interest among co-authors, and with any other published work, we, the co-authors, attest that the current research study is genuine work. Further, this study is not supported by any funding agency.

AUTHORS CONTRIBUTION

The principal author (Waqar Ahmad) has designed the central theme of the research work and carried all important steps and procedures. Dr Musswar Shah made the overall supervision of this research study. Dr. Ahmad Ali and Dr. Asad Ullah provided technical and updated literature support from time to time. Dr. Naushad Khan works on the structure of the draft.

REFERENCES

1. Abbas, H. (2010). *Shiism and sectarian conflict in Pakistan: identity politics, Iranian influence, and tit-for-tat violence*. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.
2. Abbas, S. (2007). *Probing the Jihadi mindset*. National Book Foundation.
3. Afzal, S., Iqbal, H., & Inayat, M. (2012). Sectarianism and its implications for Pakistan security: Policy recommendations using exploratory study. *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (JHSS)*, 4, 19-26. <https://doi.org/10.9790/0837-0441926>
4. Ahmad, M. (1997). Revivalism, Islamization, sectarianism and violence in Pakistan. *Pakistan*, 101-123.
5. Ahmad, M. (1998). Islamization and Sectarian violence in Pakistan. *Intellectual Discourse*, 6(1).
6. Ahmar, M. (2007). Sectarian conflicts in Pakistan. *Pakistan Vision*, 9(1), 1-19.
7. Bagozzi, R. P. & Yi, Y. (1988). On the evaluation of structural equation models. *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, 16, 74. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02723327>
8. Bansal, A. (2008). Gilgit–Baltistan: The roots of political alienation. *Strategic Analysis*, 32(1), 81-101. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160801886355>
9. Bartholomew, D. J., Steele, F., & Moustaki, I. (2008). *Analysis of multivariate social science data*. CRC press. <https://doi.org/10.1201/b15114>
10. Basit, A. (2013). The Expansion of Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 5(4), 14-16.
11. Bryman, A., & Cramer, D. (2002). *Quantitative data analysis with SPSS release 8 for Windows: a guide for social scientists*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203459621>

12. Cattell, R. B. (1952). The three basic factor-analytic research designs—their interrelations and derivatives. *Psychological bulletin*, 49(5), 499. <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0054245>
13. Fair, C. C. (2004). Militant recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and other organizations. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 27(6), 489-504. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100490513675>
14. Fair, C. C., Malhotra, N., & Shapiro, J. N. (2010). Islam, militancy, and politics in Pakistan: Insights from a national sample. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22(4), 495-521. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2010.492305>
15. Fazli, S. (2012). Sectarianism and conflict: The view from Pakistan. *Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, Retrieved*, 10(3), 15.
16. Fornell, C., & Larcker, D. F. (1981). Structural equation models with unobservable variables and measurement error: Algebra and statistics. In: Sage Publications Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3150980>
17. Freytag, A., Krüger, J. J., Meierrieks, D., & Schneider, F. (2011). The origins of terrorism: Cross-country estimates of socio-economic determinants of terrorism. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 27, S5-S16. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.06.009>
18. Fruchter, B. (1954). *Introduction to factor analysis*. Van Nostrand.
19. George, D. (2011). *SPSS for windows step by step: A simple study guide and reference, 17.0 update, 10/e*. Pearson Education India.
20. George, D., & Mallery, P. (2006). *SPSS for windows Step by Step a Simple Guide and Reference 13.0 update sixth Edition* Pearson Education. In: Inc.
21. Gishkori, Z. (2015). 212 organisations formally banned by Pakistan. *The Express Tribune*.
22. Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., Anderson, R. E., & Tatham, R. (2006). *Multivariate data analysis*. Uppersaddle River. In: NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.
23. Hussain, Z. (2008). *Frontline Pakistan: the struggle with militant Islam*. Columbia University Press.
24. Ismail, A., & Amjad, S. (2014). Determinants of terrorism in Pakistan: An empirical investigation. *Economic Modelling*, 37, 320-331. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2013.11.012>
25. Jamal, A. (2009). *Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir*. Melville Publishing House.
26. Kaplan, R. D. (2012). What's Wrong with Pakistan? *Foreign Policy*, 194, 94.
27. Khan, A. H. (1997). "Foreign Direct Investment in Pakistan: Policies and Trends" *The Pakistan Development Review*, 36(4), 959-985. <https://doi.org/10.30541/v36i4Ipp.959-985>
28. Kim, W., & Walker, M. (2012). Measuring the social impacts associated with Super Bowl XLIII: Preliminary development of a psychic income scale. *Sport Management Review*, 15(1), 91-108. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.smr.2011.05.007>
29. Kothari, C. R. (2004). *Research methodology: Methods and techniques*. New Age International.
30. Looney, R. (2004). Failed economic take-offs and terrorism in Pakistan: Conceptualizing a proper role for US assistance. *Asian Survey*, 44(6), 771-793. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2004.44.6.771>
31. Mahsood, A., & Kamran, M. (2017). Dynamics of Sectarian Violence in Pakistan: Recommendations to the Policy Makers. *Arts and Social Sciences Journal*, 8(3), 1. <https://doi.org/10.4172/2151-6200.1000283>
32. Malik, I. (1999). *Islam, nationalism and the West: Issues of identity in Pakistan*. Springer. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230375390>
33. McCall, R. B. (1975). *Fundamental statistics for psychology* (2nd ed.). Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., New York. 303-304.
34. Mir, A. (2004). *The true face of jihadis*. Mashal Books.
35. Mir, A. (2008). *The fluttering flag of Jihad*. Mashal Books.
36. Murphy, E., & Malik, A. R. (2009). Pakistan Jihad: The making of religious terrorism. *IPRI Journal*, 1(2), 17-19.
37. Nachmias, D., & Nachmias, C. (1976). *Research methods in the social sciences*.
38. Nachmias, D., & Nachmias, C. (1987). *Research Methods in the Social Sciences*. 3rd Edn., St. In: Martin's Press, New York, USA.
39. Nasir, M., Ali, A., & Rehman, F. U. (2011). Determinants of terrorism: a panel data analysis of selected South Asian countries. *The Singapore Economic Review*, 56(02), 175-187. <https://doi.org/10.1142/S0217590811004225>
40. Rafiq, A. (2014). *Pakistan's Resurgent Sectarian War*. United States Institute of Peace.
41. Rana, M. A. (2004). A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, trans. *Saba Ansari, Lahore, Pakistan: Mashal Books*.
42. Rashid, A. (2009). *Descent into chaos: the world's most unstable region and the threat to global security*: Penguin UK.
43. Raza, S. (2015). Crisis in Yemen: threats of another proxy war in Pakistan? *Conflict and Peace Studies*, 17.
44. Sekaran, U. (2003). *The Sampling Process of Research Methods for Business*. In: USA: Hermitage Publishing Services.
45. Shah, M. N. (2014). Evolution of sectarianism in Pakistan: A threat to the state and society. *South Asian Studies A Research Journal of South Asian Studies*, 29(2), 441-459.



46. Shahbaz, M., Shabbir, M. S., Malik, M. N., & Wolters, M. E. (2013). An analysis of a causal relationship between economic growth and terrorism in Pakistan. *Economic Modelling*, 35, 21-29. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2013.06.031>
47. Shakil, A. S. (2017). Jirgas in the North? *Friday Times*. <https://www.thefridaytimes.com/jirgas-in-the-north/>
48. Syed, S. H., Saeed, L., & Martin, R. P. (2015). Causes and incentives for terrorism in Pakistan. *Journal of Applied Security Research*, 10(2), 181-206. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2015.1004606>
49. Ullah, A., & Muhammad, N. (2020). Prevalence of mental health problems among youth involved in street crimes. *Rawal Medical Journal*, 45(4), 938-942.
50. Waseem, M., Kamran, T., Ali, M. A., & Riikonen, K. (2010). Dilemmas of pride and pain: sectarian conflict and conflict transformation in Pakistan.
51. Yusuf, H. (2015). "Sindh's Sectarian Challenge," The South Asia Channel. *Foreign Policy*. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/05/sindhs-sectarian-challenge/>