THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS ON THE POLAND

Purpose of the study: This study aims to present the specifics of the global financial crisis, the threats it brings for Poland in the legal sphere, and possible actions to be taken in this area, particularly at the European Union and Poland level. 
Methodology: The article uses the historical method and the analysis of documents both at the Polish and European Union levels, including laws, regulations, and decisions. 
Main Findings: The scope of the financial crisis in question and its relatively easy transfer between markets entails the necessity to apply extraordinary remedial actions. Poland, through its participation in the European Union, seems to be relatively well protected against the effects of the financial crisis. However, it needs to undertake further structural reforms, in particular reforms of public finances. 
Applications of this study: The current study is highly significant for the government of the day in this modern world; the study could be quite effective and meaningful for Higher Education Institutions, government, banks, financial institutions. 
Novelty/Originality of this study: Description of the essence of the financial crisis, possibilities of its prevention - earlier possibilities of remedial actions at the institutional and legal level, possibilities of obtaining financial support, global analysis of the problem, including its causes.

crisis arising in one region of the world is able to spread relatively quickly to other regions. This phenomenon is called the spillover effect (Penny Angkinand A., Barth J. R., Kim H., 2010). Spillover can take the form of contagion; immediate, essential effects of the crisis in many countries occur, which exceed the normal degree of economic connections between countries in the period of the lack of crisis (Wyciślak S., 2012: 244). Contagion took place especially when investors in the same countries hold the same assets. In the situation of panic, they get rid of all assets from a given category. If, for example, Hungary has economic problems and Hungarian forint loses value, investors get rid of the not only forint but also Polish zloty, putting it into the same category of assets as forint. In this way, losses in some markets lead to selloffs in other markets.
In the case of the current financial crisis, it turned out quite quickly that the phenomenon of contagion includes not only financial markets themselves but also the real economy and the sphere of public finances of countries. The crisis of financial markets was accompanied by panic in the markets of stocks, strong depreciation of currencies of developing countries, and also the increase of aversion of banks to risk, manifesting itself in the unwillingness to give interbank lends and tightening criteria of giving credits (Wyciślak S., 2012: 248). In connection with the general climate of uncertainty and the lack of confidence in the markets, these phenomena led to the transmission of crisis to the sphere of the real economy.
Facing the threat of economic collapse, particular states began to introduce expensive programs stimulating the economy as well as actions aimed at stabilizing the financial sector by rescuing banks and increasing liquidity in the interbank market. Thus, states took a large part of credit risk, leading to the transfer of this risk to the sphere of public finances (Wyciślak S., 2012: 249). As a result, the debt of many states has risen rapidly, and their bonds began to be traded higher than bonds of some companies. In the face of insolvency, states and the European Union choose one of two ways: either they print more money and buy their debts (as the United States or European Union), what as a consequence must lead to the rapid increase in inflation and devaluation of own currency, or they introduce drastic savings programs, burdening their citizens with costs of crisis (for example Ireland and Greece) (Surdej A., 2014). However, none of these ways can prevent transferring back to the real economy.
Overcoming the economic crisis is possible only through regaining competitiveness by economies, which can occur at the cost of external creditors (devaluation of own currency means de facto expropriation of foreign investors) or at the expense of own citizens who will have to bear costs of savings programs, accept the rise of taxes and reduction of earnings.

FINANCIAL CRISIS IN EUROPEAN UNION
The transfer of the worldwide financial crisis to the sphere of public finances showed threats existing in the European Union related to the shape of the economic and monetary union.
Against original assumptions, close integration in the sphere of monetary policy did not go so far together with coordination of fiscal policy, left in principle in the hands of member states (Heller J., Kotliński K., 2012: 228-232). Among states of the eurozone, consent to exceed the maximal level of deficit of public finances and national debt dominated. Some states benefited from such benefactions of the common currency as low inflation or high creditworthiness, running into debts excessively. In the situation of the financial crisis, it led to the rapid growth of debt of these states, the loss of their credit rating, and the questioning foundations of the common currency euro. These states as for example, Greece, as long as they will stay in the eurozone, cannot devalue their currency to regain competitiveness in this way. The only way of overcoming the crisis is for them savings programs with drastic effects, leading to the pauperization of own societies and external financial support, especially from European Union.

POSSIBLE FACES OF FINANCIAL CRISIS IN POLAND
How does the situation of Poland, which wrestles with an excessive deficit exceeding 3 % gross domestic product (GDP) and with the level of debt approaching dangerously to union and constitutional limit of 60% in relation to GDP, present itself against this background?
It seems that the eventual spreading financial crisis to Poland can include all three spheres mentioned above, i.e., the financial market, the sphere of public finances, and the real economy. External factors as potential sharpening financial crisis in the eurozone and the United States, speculative attacks on Polish currency, depriving Polish banks of financing by foreign parent companies can overlap on internal problems of Poland related to the condition of the Polish financial market, a situation of public finances and structure of Polish economy.
Developing a crisis in each of the three spheres will require different remedial actions. Below actions will be discussed, which are possible to be taken in the sphere of financial markets and public finances of the state.

Crisis of financial market and institutions acting in it
It is necessary to count an insufficient degree of supervision over this market, resulting mainly from the lack of uniform solutions in this branch within the framework of the whole European Union to the causes of the crisis in financial markets. It enabled large-scale speculative activity of some investment funds and rating agencies. Actions are taken recently in European Union, especially the establishment of the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) since January 1 2011, and changes in the decree of rating agencies (Łolik M., 2012: 14-16) are aimed at strengthening supervision over the financial market in whole European Union, so also in Poland.
Specificity of ESFS assumes establishing a network of authorities supervising the financial market, which includes national supervisory authorities and new European supervisory bodies: European Banking Authority, European Securities and Markets Authority, and European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority. European supervisory authorities are responsible for coordinating current supervision exercised by national bodies; they can also give binding orders for these authorities. It is of special meaning in the case of supervision over financial institutions with crossregional or even global character, where actions taken at the level of particular states turn out to be often insufficient It is worthwhile in this place to indicate the possibility of regarding public aid as consistent with the internal E.U. market if it is aimed at "remedying serious perturbations in the economy of Member State" (article 107 section 3 letter b) TFEU). Even in spite of the lack of fulfilment of this premise, the Board, resolving unanimously, can regard the aid as consistent with the internal market if "exceptional circumstances justify such decision" (article 108 section 2 paragraph 3 TFEU). Eventual support for the financial sector from public funds will always be subject to examination through union institutions. Sometimes, it can be granted only with the consent of these institutions.
The European Union, as in Poland, works on the introduction of so-called procedure resolution last, which makes orderly restructuring or liquidation of banks with the participation of institutions of state possible. On June 6, 2012, European Commission presented the draft of the so-called directive RRP (from resolution and recovery plan), which enables introducing a procedure of early intervention towards banks, which does not fulfil financial criteria (Gadomski W., 2016). On July 26 2012, in the seat of the Bank Guarantee Fund, ideas of Polish solutions in this scope prepared by the World Bank were presented. The introduction of procedure resolution will enable us to react quickly to the crisis symptoms in the banking sector, which should protect shareholders and creditors of banks from considerably higher losses than these losses, which they could incur if standard procedure based on insolvency law would be applied.

Crisis of public finances of the state a. Threats for public finances of Poland
The structure of the public finances of the Polish state does not create a consistent system. In particular, fiscal burdens are imposed on citizens most often in order to finance the current financial needs of the state (Kosikowski C., 2011: 14). Control over incurred expenses lacks too. Raised for years, ideas of reforms did not lead so far to change the planning According to article 216 section 5 Constitution, it is not allowed to take out loans, which will lead to exceeding the written in Constitution threshold of 60% of the height of public debt in relation to GDP. Exceeding and even approaching this threshold will mean the necessity of drastic cuts of public expendituresalso through reduction of some public tasks (Kosikowski C., 2016: 12).
It is necessary to appraise positively automatism of Polish legal regulation in the scope of counteracting the phenomenon of increasing public debt (Fedorowicz M., Nizioł K., 2011: 3). Polish regulation turns out to be much more inflexible than union regulation, which allows the European Commission not to take actions towards the state, in which maximal level of public debt was admittedly exceeded. Still, it decreases sufficiently approaches to the level of 60% (Council Regulation (E.U.) No 1177/2011).
Differently than in public debt, Polish financial law does not introduce a maximal level of public deficit. The threshold of 3% in relation to GDP results from union law. There are also regulations concerning counteracting excessive deficit of public finances, the so-called procedure of excessive deficit. Within the framework of this procedure, the Board can impose on a given state such sanctions as fine or duty of making an interest-free deposit in a given height. The recipe could be buying Polish debt securities from Polish National Bank. However, as well as article 220 section 2 Polish Constitution as article 123 TFEU forbid making commitments, including loans or credits for covering budget deficit (so-called ban of monetization of debt). The justification for the introduction of such regulation is fear of creating "empty" money, which cannot be covered by any assets, which could intensify inflation (Kucharski, 2011: 31).
This rule is, however, subject to far-reaching limitations, which is the possibility of acquiring debt instruments in the secondary market, i.e. after their emission and acquisition by third parties (Kucharski, 2011: 30-31). Such interpretation of Article 123 TFEU was made by European Central Bank (Fedorowicz M., Nizioł K., 2011: 8), arguing that this provision forbids only making purchases directly from entities indicated in it and not indirectly in the secondary market. A similar direction of interpretation of the Polish Constitution can lead to using Polish National Bank to finance the current loan needs of the state, which is a longer perspective that must lead to considerable growth of inflation.

b. Possibility of reaching external financial support by Poland
Besides financial support, which foreign financial institutions (among them the International Monetary Fund plays the most important role, in which Poland has a permanent credit line) could give Poland, aid obtained from European Union could be of the greatest importance for Poland.
In principle European Union is not responsible for the obligations of member statesit is the so-called no bail-out clause contained in article 125 TFEU (Sobczyński D. 2012: 26). This principle is in force in relationships with all member states; however, in TFEU itself, there are exceptions from it concerning states, which did not adopt already common euro currency (so-called states included by derogation). Article 143 TFEU includes a rich catalogue of measures, which can be applied in difficulties with balance of payments of member states included by derogation, resulting from the common upsetting balance of payments of this state or from the character of currencies, which it has in its disposal. Especially such difficulties come into play, which can expose functioning internal markets or fulfilling common commercial policy to danger. Aid for member states, which did not adopt the euro, can take the form of: 1. Agreed to turn to other international organizations (such as IMF).

Introduction of necessary measures for avoiding disturbance in commerce.
3. Giving limited credits through other member states with the consent of these states.
Poland as a member state included by derogation in the scope of introduction of the euro currency could benefit from mentioned aid, under the condition of making a proper decision by the Board.
Additionally, the aid based on provisions of the decree of the Board (E.C.) number 332/2002 (Council Regulation (E.C.) No 332/2002), which is a special instrument of financial aid for member states, which did not adopt euro currency, could be available for Poland. The condition of providing medium-term aid is a serious threat with difficulties with a current balance of payments or capital flow. The total value of loans given by the European Union is limited to 50 billion euros. So far, Hungary, Latvia and Romania (Sobczyński D. 2012: 27) benefited so far from the aid provided in decree 332/2002. In the act of public finances, there is the provision allowing to benefit from this union aid. According to article 81, section 1 of this act, the State Treasury can, upon request of the Monetary Policy Council, take medium-term credits from European Community and their member states to support a balance of payments.
In the face of the Greek crisis, an instrument aimed at serving all states of the European Union, which would be in the financial crisis, so potentially also Poland, was introduced in European Union. It was based on article 122, section 2 TFEU, which says that financial aid of the union can be granted to the state, which is essentially threatened with serious difficulties due to extraordinary circumstances being out of its control. This treaty basis allowed the adoption of the decree of E.U. number 407/2010 (Council Regulation (E.U.) No 407/2010 of May 11, 2010, establishing a European financial stabilization mechanism) on the strength of which so-called European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism -EFSM was established. It has at its disposal funds for up to 60 billion euro. It should be used in the case of states, which have serious economic or financial difficulties or are essentially threatened by them due to extraordinary circumstances being out of their control. It is worth paying attention to the premise of extraordinary circumstances out of control of the state, also resulting from mentioned article 122 section 2 TFEU. The current crisis is, to a large extent, a result of the non-observance of the discipline of public finances, which it is difficult to regard as a circumstance being out of the control of the state. So, granting aid for states on this basis is an overinterpretation of the union principle of solidarity and breaks TFEU (Fedorowicz M., Nizioł K., 2011: 7).
In light of these difficulties, the introduction of changes to TFEU became necessary. Based on the decision of the European Council from March 25 2011, section 3 was added to article 136 TFEU, according to which states, whose currency is the euro, can establish a stability mechanism, which is activated if it will be necessary for the protection of the stability of the eurozone as a whole (European Council Decision 2011/199 / E.U.).
On this basis, ministers of finances of eurozone states signed on February 2 2012, the treaty establishing European Stabilisation Mechanism -ESM. It came into effect on September 27 after ratifying it through the sixteenth state -Germany. ESM will begin functioning on July 1 2013, replacing EFSM gradually. It will have at its disposal 80 billion euros of own capital; an additional 620 billion euro will be gained by ESM by selling bonds in international financial markets.
The introduction of ESM, although profitable for the eurozone, means for Poland a step backwards in relation to so far being in force EFSM.
Firstly, differently than EFSM, which was established on the strength of the decree of E.U. and is in force for all member states, ESM was brought to life based on an international agreement concluded only between states of the eurozone -Poland is not a signatory of this agreement and did not influence its shape. This agreement, although it is related to union law (what among other things basing it on article 136 section 3 TFEU and granting some competencies to European Court of Justice and European Commission shows), does not bind Poland, however.
Secondly, Poland will not join ESM until the adoption of the common euro currencyin the contract, the possibility of joining it by states out of the eurozone (Barcz J., 2011: 12-13) was namely not provided. Until the adoption of the euro, Poland does not participate financially in ESM, does not guarantee any funds within the framework of this system, has no influence on decisions made within the framework of ESM, cannot also obtain aid from ESM. Meanwhile, funds from EFSM could serve all member states, including also Poland.
Poland can still benefit from EFSM until running out of funds from this system; however, a new mechanism -ESM is so far unavailable for it. Such shaping of ESM means strengthening of financial protection of the eurozone at simultaneous marginalization of other E.U. states. It also arouses doubts in the scope of consistency of E.U. law and fulfilment of the principle of solidarity.
A separate issue, which is worth paying attention to, is the eventual duty of Poland of joining ESM together with the adoption of the euro currency. Although it does not result from primary legislation of the E.U., it was written in point 7 of the preamble to the agreement of ESM and in article 44 of the agreement itself. Thus, it is necessary to acknowledge that new condition of joining the eurozone came into being, which is not written in TFEU (Barcz J., 2011: 12) or to